When the Arab Spring blew through the Middle East in early 2011, leaders toppled in Egypt and Tunisia and sat nervously in countries from Jordan to Yemen, awaiting the outcome of a growing uneasiness moving throughout the region. As this desire for change hit Libya, Qaddafi and his loyalists set out to crush the movement in a bloodletting none would forget.
Introduction
1 These missions did not receive wholehearted support from across the global community, but even the most jaded of critics will find it hard to argue their effect. Had coalition partners failed to intervene in the north African country, Qaddafi's forces just outside the rebel stronghold of Benghazi would have most likely succeeded in his goal of cleansing Libya "house by house" of the thousands of insurgents he labeled as "rats." 2 Amidst the mosaic of international opinion, policy, alliances and history, the decision to intervene in another country's sovereign borders is seldom met with consensus, but this instance came closer than most.
Initially a US-led coalition with French and British forces, the US portion of the intervention into Libya in March 2011 was known as Operation ODYSSEY DAWN (OD). After the opening phases, the effort transitioned from U.S to NATO leadership and was conducted under the label Operation Unified Protector (UP) until the NATO Secretary General announced the end of a "successful" mission on 31 October 2011. 3 As the first bombs of Operation OD found their targets, the body of literature by scholars examining the effort from a geo-political context down to the tactical details, has steadily grown. One of the topics consistently entering the discussion is whether or not Operations OD and UP serve as models for the future of armed humanitarian intervention.
When asked whether Libya might be a template for wars of the future, Army General
Carter Ham, Commander, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) said, "It would be wrong, in my opinion, to say this is now the template,...the model that we will follow. All military operations are...condition-specific." 4 Although Libya may not present the ultimate model for the future, the specific "conditions" General Ham mentions, the backdrop of the decision making, and the operation itself continue to be invaluable resources.
The following text will examine the unique nature of the intervention in Libya including the setting of early 2011, the political climate both in the US and abroad, the forces, organization and conduct of the operation, and lastly, present several key recommendations for the future.
The Mission in Libya
Qaddafi and the Arab Spring 
Rise of the International Mandate to Act
As the Libyan loyalists continued to press down upon the rebels, the international discourse began taking shape around the growing concept of "responsibility to protect" or "R2P."
An ongoing discussion for over two decades, R2P was the manifestation of international disdain for the horrors of the 1990s in Rwanda, the Balkans, and Darfur where states were either unable or unwilling to protect their people's basic human rights. Argued to be just the latest in the evolution of the centuries-old "just war theory," the concept of R2P was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005 and provided the moral argument, or "just war" premise for international intervention. An extremely controversial approach, R2P was seen to violate what many nations believed to be the sovereign rights of the state. However, the "sovereignty" argument began to ring hollow as stories of genocide and other atrocities of the last decades became more widely known. The R2P philosophy, it was argued, did not dismiss the notion of national sovereignty, but broadened it to mean that each state had more than rights within their territory--they had an obligation to protect their people. When this requirement is neglected, international action may be warranted in the form of humanitarian aid, sanctions, or even military intervention.
Due to the multiple dissenting views within the UN claiming R2P to be on shaky ground, potentially undercutting the stabilizing role of sovereign states on international order, the idea remained as a General Assembly resolution and lacked the legal weight of one originating from the Security Council. 12 In spite of the debate and concern regarding the concept, R2P appeared well suited for the case in Libya, where a populace engaged in an internal struggle against a brutal sovereign. Therefore, on 26 February, the UNSC decided to levy UNSCR 1970 which imposed an arms embargo and froze Qaddafi assets held overseas. UNSCR 1970 also called for an end to the violence, urged Libyan authorities to respect human rights, permit the safe passage of humanitarian supplies, and lift restrictions imposed against the media--all in an attempt to send a clear signal to the regime that they must desist. , to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council.
14 Regardless of broad skepticism toward the phrase "all necessary measures", Russia and China both avoided use of their inherent veto powers as permanent members, thereby bridling their longstanding view that the UN should not use force to infringe on the sovereignty of a state. 15 Additionally, the phrase "acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements" became problematic as the looser language failed to clearly establish a command structure, significantly impacting expeditious, coordinated planning. 16 Imperfect as it was, and without warm support from several countries including Germany and Turkey, the UN had its mandate to act and the French and British would lead the European pack. Dissenting voices claimed this was an alarming form of mission creep, or worse yet, disingenuous maneuvering to achieve a goal of regime change some countries wanted from the beginning. As to the charge of "mission creep", the alliance had ruled out explicitly stating regime change as a goal from the onset, but many held to the quiet belief that any effort to protect Libyan civilians that did not remove Qaddafi from power was doomed to failure. 20 
Operations
With an undeniable, although ambiguous mandate in hand, the allies had the green light.
As the default regional military coordination element, NATO started to corral planning resources to develop an agreed-upon way ahead while the US, France, and UK also leaned forward in accordance with national prerogatives. As opposed to the 1999 air war over Kosovo that slowly crept toward air strikes on significant economic, communications, and transportation targets in an "escalation of force", planners for Libyan operations were tightly bound by rules of engagement (ROE) focused on protection of the people with minimal collateral damage, ever mindful of a desire to get the country back on its feet as quickly as possible after hostilities. Major General Woodward revealed later, "I remember all of us being terrified that we wouldn't be able to turn them back in time and that they would overrun the city, and we just couldn't even imagine the massacre that would ensue." 29 "At the beginning," she also said, "I thought we may have been given the mission too late." 30 Her perception was widely shared.
From the French, British, and US perspective, the situation on the ground dictated immediate action that air power could provide, and unfortunately, NATO's command structure was unprepared to respond quickly enough. Under Woodward's command from the AOC at Ramstein, the 17th Air Force staff, greatly assisted by 3rd Air Force, coordinated assets in the first 24 hours of Operation OD that destroyed 22 of 24 fixed air defense sites in Libya. In contrast to common practice in western air power doctrine, the coalition not only struck at the heart of the integrated air defense system (IADS) in the opening volley, they struck directly at the heart of the hostile ground forces as well. 31 In response to Washington's initial insistence on establishing the no-fly zone without kinetic strikes, JTF leadership effectively communicated the "extremely high risk" of such an approach, and was able to destroy air defenses as required to support the fight on the ground. 32 After the first 24 hours, aircraft from the US, France, and UK struck another set of targets, and in the days following, were assisted by aircraft and crews from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway, Qatar, and Spain. 33 Eager to hand over the lead and play a supporting role due to domestic political imperatives, the US relinquished command to NATO on 31 March after 13 days of destroying much of Qaddafi's fixed military infrastructure, and Operation OD gave way to Operation UP. However, since the NATO CAOC in Poggio Renatico, Italy charged with taking the lead from Ramstein had significant communications issues at handoff, the 603d AOC continued much of their role for a few days after the 31 March handoff.
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Force Challenges
Although the mission successfully repelled the loyalist forces from Benghazi, the slow decision for the US to support with combat forces led to subsequently slow force provision. As a Control System (AWACS) aircraft were also unavailable for the challenging first strikes.
Missing their capabilities, fighter aircrew were required to serve as a kind of forward air control air battle manager, sequencing and de-conflicting flights in addition to finding and identifying their own, often difficult targets. 35 In the wake of these challenges with force allocation, USAFE
Commander General Mark Welsh stated that "Libya demonstrated the value of forward presence." Maj Gen Woodward followed with, "We talk all the time about ...global reach, and I think we become a little bit insular by saying, 'Well, we can do everything by reachback,'...OD was a 'wake-up call...If we didn't have forward basing, I feel very confident that we would not have prevented' the slaughter threatened for Benghazi." Libya for the purposes of humanitarian aid. 38 However, along with the somewhat puzzling abstention of German forces, all was not well within the coalition. At a parting speech to NATO ministers, the outbound Secretary Gates "chided them for having insufficient inventory of weapons--a symptom, he said, of NATO countries' failing to spend enough on their military forces." 39 Although British and French officials denied any reports of depleted stocks affecting the mission, Gates was unconvinced. Additionally, as the US president showed haste in wanting to "hand over" leadership of the operation to NATO, some in NATO found this unsettling as Americans appeared to be distancing themselves from a traditional leadership role in NATO.
Finally, as the operation transitioned to Unified Protector, the US became a participant with significant "caveats"--providing critical support aircraft, but withholding strike assets. 40 AFRICOM headquarters also found the intervention to be quite taxing. Designed for training and advising rather than leading air campaigns, the headquarters was lacking in kinetic targeting experience according to General Ham. 41 Although individuals within the command had accomplished these core tasks in other theaters, the command itself was not proficient in the mission. Ham continued to say one of the biggest lessons "for me and for the headquarters and the staff is: Combatant commands don't get to choose their missions ...Geographic combatant commands must be full-spectrum commands...We must always retain the capability to do the higher-end operations."
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Recommendations Force Mixture
Debate among US and world leaders continues regarding how best to spend defense funds in a challenging fiscal environment. Following a counterinsurgency in Iraq and while still combating irregular forces in Afghanistan, many valuable lessons have been captured regarding both how to conduct and prepare for irregular warfare. Countries see the importance of maintaining a cadre of elite forces able to execute special operations around the globe ranging from direct action to foreign internal defense in order to shape areas in accordance with national interests. Although special forces will remain a critical element of the defense structure, Libya provides a case for continuing development of conventional air forces for future operations. In Libya, coalition forces were able to rapidly respond in support of separatist ground forces,
providing them the precise, tactical edge required to regain momentum in the war. Coalition forces that had invested in precision-guided weapons were able to contribute, and those that could not were either excluded or given other duties.
The years of investment in ISR platforms and the ability to conduct air-to-air refueling made this possible. However, NATO countries have begun to rely extensively on the US for these capabilities in particular, reflecting the growing disparity between the average 1.6 percent of GDP spent by Europeans and the four percent spent by the US for defense. In Libya alone, the US provided 75 percent of the ISR data and 75 percent of the air refueling platforms required for mission completion. Additionally, airpower continues to provide the unique capability, when applied in the right context, to intentionally confine intervention to the technological, standoff dimension. It will not provide a strategic panacea professed by Douhet, or a replacement for land power's unique capabilities, but a key tool to enable an "offshore balancing" coercive tool for statecraft that requires minimal boots on the ground. It would have been incredibly difficult to achieve the zero-casualty rate the coalition maintained, keep costs relatively low ($1.1B for the US), and prevent the wholesale massacre of the Libyan separatists without these capabilities.
NATO Leadership
As the US continues to leverage multilateralism to share cost and increase effectiveness of foreign policy, we must find innovative means to maintain our leadership position in NATO, or accept the costs of playing a reduced role. More than garnering the theatrical limelight with his pronouncement at the beginning operations, Sarkozy represented an emerging role for the French as leaders in NATO. To many a welcome addition to defray the disproportionate expenditures by the US through the years, this increased role begets increased influence in the process. As many of the critical missions were still accomplished by US forces, the conspicuous shift to non-combat missions and "handing over" the mission to NATO was definitely not 
Forward Presence
One author's take on "the critical lesson" from Operations ODYSSEY DAWN and Unified Protector "is that there's simply no substitute for forward deployed forces." 45 He may be correct. In addition to PGMs, tankers, ISR, data link, and the myriad of other technologies that fuel air power, forward basing and engagement are critical. Forward basing gives US assets persistent access to support missions abroad with reduced response time. As Major General
Woodward mentioned, waiting for the response of AFRICOM's request for forces would have meant mission failure for her team. Forward basing also injects servicemen consistently into interoperability exercise opportunities with nearby countries that are difficult to achieve from stateside bases. This face-to-face interaction improves mutual understanding, commonality in techniques, and forges relationships key to reducing the inevitable fog and friction at the start of any contingency. AFRICOM participation in Exercise AUSTERE CHALLENGE with their joint and allied partners was credited with better preparing the staff for OD. Additionally, forward presence improves a broader understanding of regional intelligence concerns, patterns of life, and key indicators for decision makers. Strong DoD advocacy of these concepts with
Congress is critical to continually remind key legislators, often seeing overseas basing as competition for their constituents' dollars, of the high costs of neglecting this resource.
Conclusion
Though Operations ODYSSEY DAWN and Unified Protector reminded us of lessons of past conflicts and offered useful insights into a changing world, they should undoubtedly be examined in the context of their unique conditions. Intervention in Libya occurred with generally favorable world opinion, UN credibility, multinational participants, and in support of an indigenous populace eager to fight on the ground for their future. However, several themes from this story warrant careful consideration as leaders ponder future policy decisions. Modern, capable conventional air forces continue to have a key role in a world along with their unconventional counterparts, US defers a leadership role in NATO at a cost, and although expensive, there is no substitute for forward deployed forces.
